ASFEE 6 in Paris

Authors > Bousquet Léa

Monday 15
Intertemporal Preferences

› 10:50 - 11:15 (25min)
› 251
Time Inconsistency And Naivety with Monetary Rewards
Léa Bousquet  1, 2@  
1 : Paris School of Economics
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)
Paris -  France
2 : Sciences Po Paris - Institut d'études politiques de Paris  (IEP Paris)  -  Website
Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Paris
27 rue Saint-Guillaume - 75337 Paris Cedex 07 -  France

The purpose of this paper is to measure time inconsistency and naivety degrees thanks to monetary rewards in a lab experiment. I run an experiment in two sessions. During the second one, I used the well-established design of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), the Convex Time Budget in order to measure time inconsistency (eg. present bias). During the first session, I adapt this design in order to elicit the participant beliefs about their time inconsistency degree. Indeed, I ask them to declare what decisions they think they will take at a future date.
With preliminary results, I show that a third of the participants maximize their payoffs without even discounting their future payoffs. Then, descriptive statistics suggest that subjects can be present or future biased depending the amplitude of the delays between the two allocation dates. Also the accuracy between the anticipation and the actual decisions depend on these delays.


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